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The Chief Justice of the United States: More 
than Just the Highest Ranking Judge 
Alan B. Morrison and D. Scott Stenhouse* 
The Chief Justice has always been more than first among 
equals. His position as chair of the Supreme Court's weekly con-
ferences, at which tentative votes are taken on cases that have 
been argued, and decisions made on which cases will have full 
briefing and argument, is more than titular. His power to choose 
who will write the majority opinion, if he is on that side, can influ-
ence the course of the law, which depends at least as much on the 
rationale as on the result. And his symbolic function as the leader 
of our entire judicial system has always been important. 
Such differences between his role and that of the other Jus-
tices are traditional and probably necessary. This article is about 
a more recent and more disturbing phenomenon: the plethora of 
nonjudicial responsibilities that modern Chief Justices have as-
sumed or, more often, been assigned by Congress. Every Justice, 
and indeed every federal judge, has some administrative duties. 
But the Chief Justice has more of them, and on the whole his are 
more significant. Cumulatively, his responsibilities raise several 
serious questions. 
The first is time. With increasing outside duties and an in-
creasing caseload, is it possible for one person to continue to han-
dle all of these tasks effectively? Or will nonjudicial activities 
detract from the Court's primary function? 
As a result of these activities, there has also been a significant 
increase of the power of the Chief Justice. Some of his preroga-
tives are merely managerial. But many, such as the power to ap-
point important committees and to act as spokesman for the 
federal judiciary, entail significant policy-making functions. 
Should we be concerned about such concentrations of power in 
one individual? No Chief Justice has been accused of any scan-
dalous improprieties. But scandal is not the only danger inherent 
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in extra-judicial endeavors. The administrative work of every 
Chief Justice inevitably brings him or her into situations that 
could tarnish the image of the Court, to the point where it is seen 
as simply another participant in political disputes. If that were to 
occur, it might do serious damage to the confidence most Ameri-
cans have in the fundamental fairness of our court of last resort. 
A final reason for studying the Chief Justice's duties is to 
broaden our conception of the qualities that should be sought in 
those who are considered for the office. What does the job 
involve? 
I. TIME COMMITMENTS 
"If the burdens of the office continue to increase as they have 
in the past years, it may be impossible for the occupant to perform 
all of the duties well and survive very long." Those words were 
spoken by Chief Justice Burger in December, 1978.1 Nearly ten 
years earlier, however, he endorsed the idea of judges serving on 
the boards of nonprofit groups "so long as the demands on their 
time and energy do not violate the absolute priority of their court 
duties."2 
Are those statements consistent, and if so, where is the prob-
lem? To begin, most of the Chief Justice's nonjudicial duties have 
been imposed by Congress. Has this occurred too often? One 
standard by which to answer that question was supplied by Sena-
tor Ervin, who declared that a judge's first responsibility is to "be 
a full-time judge in his own court."3 The most time-consuming 
obligation of the Chief Justice, apart from judging, is his role as 
head of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is, in 
essence, the policy-making body of the federal judiciary. It is 
comprised of the chief judges of all federal courts of appeals and a 
district judge from each of the circuits (other than the new Federal 
Circuit).4 The Conference is charged with supervision of the fed-
eral court system-trying to assure that cases are promptly de-
cided, recommending rules changes, initiating or responding to 
legislation relating to virtually every aspect of what transpires in 
1. Address to the Conference on the Role of the Judiciary in America, December 14. 
1978. The speech has never been printed. The quotation is from page 19 of a transcript 
made from a tape recording prepared by the Institute [hereinafter cited as AEI Speech). 
2. Nonjudicial Activilies of Supreme Courl Justices and Olher Federal Judges: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Separalion of Powers of I he Senale Comm. on I he Judiciary, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1969) (statement of Tom C. Clark, Director of the Federal Judi-
cial Center) [hereinafter cited as Senale Hearings]. 
3. !d at 156. 
4. 28 us.c. § 331 (1976). 
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the federal courts, and the like.s When it was created by Congress 
in 1922, the Conference met for one day each year. Now it has 
two two-day meetings, and according to the Chief Justice each cf 
these requires an additional two or three days for preparation.6 
Besides serving as presiding officer, the Chief Justice appoints 
the chairmen of over twenty committees,? dealing with subjects 
like court administration, the jury system, probation, and federal 
magistrates. Among the most important are those which consider 
possible changes in procedural rules. The Conference's commit-
tees on judicial conduct advise judges about the propriety of vari-
ous activities, review their reports of extra-judicial income, and 
assist them with their financial disclosure forms required by the 
Ethics in Government Act. The Chief Justice also appoints the 
principal staff on several of these committees. Because of the key 
role played by the committees, he keeps in close touch with their 
chairs. In 1972, Congress authorized the appointment of an Ad-
ministrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, in part to relieve him of 
some of the liaison functions with groups such as the Judicial 
Conference.s But as Chief Justice Burger himself recognized, 
"there is a limit to the delegation of functions and a limit in dele-
gating decisionmaking."9 
A second major responsibility is his position as chair of the 
Board of the Federal Judicial Center.Io Congress has directed 
that he, the six sitting federal judges, and the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, who comprise the 
Center's Board, meet quarterly to oversee its work. II The Center, 
whose primary function is to engage in research, training, and ed-
ucation for the judicial branch,I2 has a budget which has in-
creased from $500,000 at its inception in 1967 to almost $8,600,000 
today.B It engages in a wide range of research projects, offers 
5. Jd 
6. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 20-21. 
7. P. fiSH, THE POLITICS OF fEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 269 (1973). 1982 
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES iv-
vi lists nineteen that reported at that meeting, plus a number of subcommittees, the princi-
pal ones being those on rules of practice. Apparently, there is no published up-to-date list 
of the Conference's committees. 
8. Pub. L. No. 92-238, 86 Stat. 406 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 677 (1976)). 
9. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 25. 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 62l(a)(l) (1976). 
II. 28 U.S.C. §§ 621, 622 (1976). 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1976). The Center also issues an annual report which is helpful 
in understanding its functions and operations and provides the basis for the description 
which follows. 
13. Hearings on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judician• and 
Related Agencies Appropriations, for 1983 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, ·State, 
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training sessions for judges and nonjudicial personnel in the sys-
tem, and has committees on such topics as prisoners' civil rights 
suits, revising jury instructions, and conducting conferences for 
appellate judges. Like the committees of the Judicial Conference, 
those working under the Federal Judicial Center also require the 
time and attention of the Chief Justice. 
A third duty concerns the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts. This Office works closely with the Federal Judicial 
Center and the Judicial Conference in the broad area of judicial 
administration. It is almost impossible to assign many of the 
Chief Justice's duties to any one of the three because there is so 
much overlap. His specific responsibilities for the Administrative 
Office arise because its director and deputy are appointed by the 
Supreme Court and their work is under the direction of the Judi-
cial Conference.'4 Since courts or conferences cannot, as a practi-
cal matter, supervise individuals, much of the responsibility falls 
on the Chief Justice. 
A great deal of what the Administrative Office does, such as 
handling pay and purchasing books and other supplies,'s is gener-
ally no burden to the Chief Justice. But the Office is also the ma-
jor source of data for the Judicial Conference and the Congress 
about the use of the federal courts. These, in turn, are vital to the 
Chief because of his concerns about the increasing case load, the 
adequacy of judicial salaries, and the number of judges. For these 
reasons he has become involved, although probably to a lesser de-
gree than in other areas of court administration, in the work of the 
Administrative Office. 
Another major responsibility is what he has referred to some-
what facetiously as his "role of building manager of the Supreme 
Court building."'6 Of course, the day to day operations are han-
dled by the marshall, clerk, librarian, reporter of decisions, and 
the Chiefs administrative assistant.' 7 They in turn are subject to 
the supervision of the whole Court. In some cases this is done by 
Court committees; in others the job has fallen to individual Jus-
tices, particularly the Chief Justice. 
Chief Justice Burger has taken his duties in managing the 
Supreme Court building very seriously. He himself has men-
The Judiciary of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong .. 2d Sess. 321 (1982) (state-
ment of A. Leo Levin, Director, Federal Judicial Center). 
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604(a) (1976). 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1976). The Administrative Office also publishes annual reports 
that set forth its functions and operations. 
16. AEI Speech. supra note I, at 24. 
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 671-677 (1976). 
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tioned the time that he spends in making decisions relating to the 
modernization of the Court's equipment.ts Other observers have 
mentioned his involvement in such details as ordering painL, 
planting flowers, having the reflecting pools painted blue, and in-
stalling exhibits for tourists.t9 He has also changed the lighting of 
the courtroom, altered the shape of the Justices' bench, moved the 
journalists' location, and improved the cafeteria. Indeed, he is so 
well versed in the Court's budget that he was able to recite down 
to the last dollar the overtime charges that were being run up in 
the print shop in trying to have all the opinions ready for Monday 
morning before the practice was changed in the mid-1960s.2o 
Congress has also required the Chief Justice to make various 
kinds of appointments. Many involve temporary or special pur-
pose courts such as the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals,2t which in recent years has concentrated on energy price 
litigation, and the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation,22 
which coordinates complex cases arising in various locations 
around the country.23 He is also empowered to assign judges 
within the federal system to fill temporary needs-with their con-
sent and that of their chief judge-including trips to such places as 
the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.24 
These assignments do not comprise a significant portion of his 
work load, but they are one more straw on the camel's back. 
Equally important, they may permit the Chief to exercise ex-
traordinary influence in certain areas of the law. 
Congress has assigned to the Chief Justice many activities 
which are remote from judicial administration. In 1846 it made 
him a Regent of the Smithsonian2s and more recently a trustee of 
the National Gallery of Art and the Joseph M. Hirshhorn Mu-
seum and Sculpture Garden.26 Other outside positions, not con-
18. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 24. 
19. Oster, Burger: High Court Politician, Chicago Sun Times, Dec. 4, 1977, p. 4. 
20. Interview with Carl Stem, NBC Washington Correspondent (April II, 1979). 
The significance of the episode is in the fact that the Chief Justice considered such an 
administrative detail to be of sufficient importance to be worth his time to investigate, 
presumably in order to prevent similar problems from arising in the future. 
21. Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 2ll(b)(l). 85 Stat. 743, 749 (1971) (set out as a note in 12 
U.S.C. § 1904 (1976)). 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). 
23. According to Chief Justice Burger, he and his predecessor have made more than 
fifty appointments under these and similar provisions. Burger, Annual Report on the State 
of the Judiciary at the midyear meeting of the American Bar Association. Feb. 6, 1983 at II 
[hereinafter cited as 1983 ABA Speech]. 
24. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1694(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981); 48 U.S.C. § 1614(a) (1976). 
25. Act of Aug. 10, 1846, ch. 178, § 3, 9 Stat. 102, 103 (1846) (current version at 20 
U.S.C. § 42 (1976)). 
26. 20 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 76cc(b) (1976). 
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gressionally imposed, include: Honorary Chairman of the Board 
of Trustees of the Supreme Court Historical Society (a group 
formed at his urging); Honorary Trustee of the National Geo-
graphic Society; and Honorary Chairman of the Institute on Judi-
cial Administration and the National Judicial College.27 Some of 
these are pleasant diversions, yet they can become demanding. It 
is worth recalling that Chief Justice William Howard Taft re-
signed from the Board of Yale University because he felt the ten 
meetings a year did not permit him to maintain his work load on 
the Court.2s 
There is a great deal that the Chief Justice has to do simply 
because he is the Chief Justice-the inevitable swearings-in, re-
ceptions, and attendance at joint sessions of Congress addressed 
by the president.29 While every other Justice is assigned to one 
federal judicial circuit for administrative and other duties, the 
Chief and two other Justices are assigned an additional circuit.Jo 
Each year the circuit holds a conference which its Justice usually 
attends and often addresses. The Chief Justice also makes an an-
nual address on the state of the judiciary to the American Bar 
Association, and frequently speaks before the American Law In-
stitute, law schools, and other gatherings. 
How much time does all this take? By one report, the Chief 
Justice has timed his own work week at seventy-seven hours, with 
about one-third devoted to non-case activities.3I He has also 
stated that no member of the Court works less than sixty hours a 
week.32 Surely, by any measure, his work load is considerable, 
and the burdens from his non-case activities are significant. 
Some perspective can be gained by considering his extra-judi-
cial duties in light of the Court's case load. For example, during 
the 1953 Term (Earl Warren's first) the Court issued sixty-five 
signed opinions; in the 1981-82 Term that figure was 141, or more 
than double the number thirty years before; in the same period, 
the number of cases on the Court's docket went from 1463 to 
5311.33 
Have outside activities prevented the Chief Justice from writ-
27. WHo's WHO IN AMERICA 453 (42d ed. 1982-83). 
28. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 141 (statement of Alexander M. Bickel). 
29. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 24. 
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 42. A listing of current assignments appears at 457 U.S. ii (1982). 
31. Oster, supra note 19, at 4. 
32. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 26. See also 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23, at 9, 
in which the Chief Justice stated that the Court's work load presents "a very grave problem 
and something must be done." 
33. 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23, at I. While different measures might produce 
different percentage increases, and while numbers alone are not the sole measure of the 
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ing a reasonable share of the Court's opinions? During the five 
terms ending in June, 1982, he averaged the same number of ma-
jority opinions as his colleagues. Yet he wrote far fewer concur-
rences and dissents than any other Justice, perhaps partly because 
he cast relatively few dissenting votes. This may reflect a convic-
tion that, as Chief Justice, he should try to harmonize the Court's 
work and that therefore concurrences and dissents should be used 
sparingly.34 But there is at least some evidence that in a few cases 
each year there is not enough time for the Chief to add his concur-
ring or dissenting views, and so he joins others rather than sepa-
rately stating his own position.Js 
Can a Chief Justice, despite considerable nonjudicial work, 
devote adequate thought to judging? Charles Evans Hughes and 
Joseph R. Lamar, who served on presidential commissions while 
they were Associate Justices, were reportedly unable to maintain 
their full judicial work loads.36 Indeed, Hughes acknowledged 
that he was so worn out by the added burdens that his work was 
impaired for several months even after the commission was con-
cluded. This was during an era when the Court's case load was 
relatively light. Chief Justice Burger says that the Court should 
give full treatment to no more than 100 cases each year if it is to 
maintain adequate quality.37 The current level, including full per 
curiam opinions, is more than fifty percent beyond this figure. 
Some of a Chiefs activities will inevitably reflect personal in-
terests. The incumbent, for instance, cares intensely about judicial 
administration. But most of his duties are mandatory and, since 
his successor will probably have some favorite causes, the work 
load of non-case activities is not likely to decrease substantially. 
As Chief Justice Burger put it, just "because the Chief Justices, up 
to now, have somehow managed to cope, we should not assume 
that these glacial pressures can always be kept under control."Js 
Court's work load, no one doubts that there has been a significant increase in the demands 
on the Court's time. 
34. In the 1981-82 Term, the Chief Justice continued to have a below average ntmber 
of concurring and dissenting opinions, but his dissenting votes cast (opinions written plus 
those he joined) equalled the numerical average for all nine Justices. 
35. Linda Greenhouse, who covers the Court for the New York Times, attempted to 
find the Chief Justice's mark on the 1981 Term, but found his role was decidedly secon-
dary, particularly with regard to the Court's most important decisions. N.Y. Times, July 
20, 1982, p. A20, col. I. But in the most recent term he wrote the opinions in two of the 
most significant cases, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) 
and Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). 
36. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 139 (statement of Alexander M. Bickel). 
37. AEI Speech, supra note 2, at 13; 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23, at 7-8, 12. 
38. AEI Speech, supra note I, at 29. 
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II. POLITICAL POWER 
It would be hard to find an educated American who does not 
realize that in making constitutional law the Supreme Court 
wields a significant kind of political power. The nonjudicial polit-
ical powers of the Chief Justice are less well appreciated. Con-
gress has assigned him a major role in three significant policy-
making fields: creating rules for the federal courts, participating 
in the legislative process, and appointing judges to certain special 
courts. 
The role of judges-and particular Supreme Court Justices-
in fashioning or approving procedures derives from the common-
sense notion that they are uniquely qualified for this task. In 1934 
Congress gave the Court the job of writing federal rules of civil 
procedure, subject only to the right of Congress to override them 
by statute.J9 Since then Congress has also given the Court respon-
sibility for the criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy rules, and-
subject to a veto by either house of Congress-the rules of evi-
dence (except those relating to the law of privilege).4o 
As every attorney knows, procedural rules sometimes deter-
mine cases. Indeed, when the Court sent over its Rules of Evi-
dence in 1972, they created such a controversy that Congress 
substantially rewrote them.4t 
Two examples will give a sense of the significance of some 
procedural rules. The class action enables the aggregation of 
small claims that could not economically be brought individually. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that in cases princi-
pally seeking money damages the complainant must notify each 
class member of the case by the best means available, so that each 
may decide whether to join the case or proceed separately.42 This 
rule makes sense if each person has a significant sum of money at 
stake, say $1,000 or more. But when each claim is only fifteen 
dollars, and there are three million members of the class, the rule 
makes class actions impossible, especially since the plaintiff must 
39. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)). See generally Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of1934, 130 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1015 ( 1982). 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (appellate); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2075 (1976) (bankruptcy); and 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976) (evidence). It is now clear that the 
veto over rules of evidence is void, I=igration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S. 
Ct. 2764 (1983). but perhaps this veto will be deemed severable from the grant of rule-
making authority. 
41. For a discussion of the legislative history of this congressional intervention in the 
rule-making process, see 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051. 
42. fED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2). 
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pay the cost of the individual notice.43 The Court could easily 
change the rule, and thereby encourage class actions, but it has 
chosen not to do so.44 
Or consider discovery. In civil cases, the discovery rules are 
quite liberal, which helps the claimant when the evidence is 
largely in the possession of the other side, as often occurs in com-
plex antitrust and securities fraud litigation. Sometimes these 
rules have an opposite effect, enabling a wealthy defendant to 
overwhelm a small opponent with extensive and time-consuming 
discovery, forcing a cheap settlement. Clearly, any change in dis-
covery rules will alter the results of some cases. 
In theory, the power of the Chief Justice, as one of nine Jus-
tices who vote on all rule changes, is no greater than that of his 
colleagues. In fact, that is not the way the system works. Of ne-
cessity, the Justices give proposed rules only a cursory glance. 
This reality elevates the importance of the drafters. Rules propos-
als come from the Judicial Conference, headed by the Chief Jus-
tice, after passing through the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and the appropriate advisory committee, 
whose members are his appointees.45 In addition, the staff person 
who does the basic research for the advisory committee (known as 
the reporter) is selected by the Chief Justice. Since most potential 
reporters are academics, their views are often readily ascertain-
able, making it possible to ensure that appointees concentrate on 
areas of importance to the Chief and rarely suggest rule changes 
that are inconsistent with his philosophy. While the committee 
system is not simply an extension of the Chief Justice's personal 
staff, there is a close connection between them not readily appar-
ent from the formal structure established by Congress. At the 
very least it provides a substantial protection against unfriendly 
rule changes reaching the Supreme Court where they would have 
to be formally voted down to be defeated.46 
One recent addition to the Chief Justice's powers in the rule-
43. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). 
44. It should be noted that the 1966 amendments to the class action rules were in-
tended to increase the availability of class actions in the federal courts. The point is not 
that one approach or the other is preferable, but that the Court's ~wer to make such 
significant changes embodies a major policy-making component. 
45. For a summary of the actual operation of the rule-making process for the federal 
couns. see Hearings on Rulemaking Oversight Bifore the Subcomm. on Courts. Civil Liber-
ues, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciar)', 98th Cong .. 1st 
Sess. (1983) (statement of Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure). 
46. The Court has notified Congress that it would "see no reason to oppose legislation 
to eliminate this court from the rulemaking process." Legal Times of Wash., May 22. 1983 
p. 2, col. I. 
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making process deserves special mention. In the Classified Infor-
mation Procedures Act of 198{)47 Congress sought a solution to the 
problem of what to do with classified materials that become part 
of court proceedings, as well as the problem of "graymail"-the 
threat by a defendant in a criminal case to use classified informa-
tion to defend himself. The job of writing the security procedures 
was given jointly to the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the 
Director of the CIA, and the Secretary of Defense.4s Aside from 
any problems that may arise if the Supreme Court ever has to 
decide the validity of those rules, the notion that the Chief Justice 
and members of the Executive Branch should jointly issue regula-
tions of this kind contradicts the basic tenets of separation of pow-
ers. Not only is the Chief Justice's role undesirable, it is also 
plainly unnecessary. 
Another major source of the Chiefs political power is his 
ability to influence legislation. The formal power to propose or 
evaluate bills resides in the Judicial Conference, not the Court or 
the Chief Justice. The Federal Judicial Center and the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts also play a role through 
their research and the statistics they provide, which are often used 
by the Chief Justice in his speeches to support or oppose a given 
recommendation. Their evidence is especially influential in con-
gressional decisions about the number of federal judges and sup-
port personnel and, less directly, on whether new kinds of cases 
should be allowed in the federal courts in light of the current case 
load. In addition, the Judicial Center's research "often involves 
matters that are subjects of legislative consideration-for example, 
criminal code revision, the Speedy Trial Act, or proposals to 
restructure judges' sentencing discretion .... "49 
Congress undoubtedly needs assistance when it writes legisla-
tion that affects the courts. Chief Justice Burger believes it is "ab-
solutely necessary" for judges to provide this assistance.so Yet 
there are others who, at least collectively, are equally well quali-
fied to do so, without tarnishing the appearance of judicial neu-
trality. Indeed, it is largely because judges seem to be neutral that 
when the Judicial Conference proposes a statute, or comments on 
one suggested by others, its views are treated with unusual respect. 
No doubt the Conference's long-standing opposition to al-
47. 18 U.S C. App. §§ 1-16 (Supp. V 1981). 
48. 18 U.SC. App. § 9(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
49. fEDER.'\L JUDICIAL CENTER, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1981). 
50. The remarks were made at a speech at Fordham University several weeks after 
Congressional passage of the Bankruptcy Act in 1978, and are quoted in The Third 
Branch, Nov. 1978. p. 3, col. 2. 
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lowing veterans to bring suits to challenge denials of benefits51 is 
partly responsible for the failure of that proposal to be adopted. 
Similarly, the negative views of the Conference's Ad Hoc Com-
mittee On Judicial Review Provisions In Regulatory Reform Leg-
islation may well have been responsible for modifying proposals 
for greater judicial scrutiny of decisions of administrative 
agencies.s2 
The influence of the Chief Justice himself on legislation may 
in some senses be more powerful than in rule making, even 
though the Conference can only make recommendations. Unlike 
rule making, in which every Justice has a vote, none of the re-
maining eight has a legislative role since the views are expressed 
by the Judicial Conference, not the Court. Some of the Confer-
ence's legislative recommendations come from standing commit-
tees over which the Chief Justice has the considerable powers 
described above; in other cases special committees are formed, 
where the Chiefs decision to create a new group may be the single 
most important aspect of the process. 
It is impossible to assess fully the Chief Justice's impact on 
legislation because his influence is often subtle. Perhaps more im-
portant, his role is unclear because the meetings of the commit-
tees, as well as of the Judicial Conference itself, are conducted 
behind closed doors-a prerogative the Conference fought hard to 
maintain in 1980 when Senator Dennis DeConcini proposed to 
open virtually all of them to the public.s3 
Appointments are the third major source of the Chief Jus-
tice's political power. In addition to appointing committees and 
top staff for the Judicial Conference and the Judicial Center, he is 
authorized to select, from the federal judiciary, the chief judge 
and the members of several special courts. One of these courts-
the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals-is now responsible 
for appeals in all oil and gas pricing and allocation cases.s4 Obvi-
ously, his choice of these judges can have a major impact on the 
development of the law. While no one has suggested that the 
Chief Justice has unfairly balanced TECA, the possibility none-
theless exists and warrants serious thought. 
51. See, e.g., 1981 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 65-66. 
52. ld at 60-61. None of the proposals has yet become law. 
53. See Letter from William E. Foley. Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Couns, to Senator Dennis DeConcini (June 18, 1980) opposing S. 2045, the 
Judicial Conference in the Sunshine Act. See also Nelson, Secretive Judicial Conference 
Could Open Its Drapes, Legal Times of Wash., March 15. 1982, p. 9. col. I. 
54. See text accompanying note 21 supra; 17 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4105 (1978 & Supp. 1982). 
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Another extremely important power that Congress has given 
the Chief Justice is the right to name the members of the trial and 
appellate benches of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
created by Congress to oversee the use of wiretaps by the execu-
tive branch in the foreign intelligence area.ss Most of the original 
appointees were judges with reputations for upholding the govern-
ment's position in criminal cases; in 1981 they lived up to their 
reputations by approving all 431 Justice Department requests to 
start or continue electronic surveillance.s6 Unlike the President's 
judicial appointments, these designations by the Chief Justice are 
not subject to Senate confirmation. While no one expected the 
present Chief Justice to fill the positions only with civil libertari-
ans, it surely would be more consistent with stated congressional 
intentions to ensure better balance, perhaps by requiring that the 
assignments be approved by the Supreme Court as a whole. 
In suggesting that the Chief Justice has political power, it is 
important not to overstate the case. He obviously does not possess 
non-judicial power comparable to that of, say, a leader of Con-
gress. But he has enough influence to justify a reevaluation of this 
aspect of the office. 
Ill. MAINTAINING THE APPEARANCE OF 
IMPARTIALITY 
The Supreme Court has been called the "least dangerous 
branch" because it lacks the two great powers of the sword and 
the purse.s7 Its power ultimately rests on public support. That in 
tum requires a popular belief that it is an impartial tribunal. 
At least some of the Chief Justice's activities are potentially 
damaging to this aura of impartiality. One of the themes echoed 
by almost every witness at the 1969 Senate hearings on non-judi-
cial activities of federal judges was that judges ought to stay out of 
controversial matters.ss As Senator Ervin said, "There seems to 
be widespread agreement with Chief Justices Hughes' statement 
that the business of judges is 'to hear appeals and not to make 
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. V. 1981). 
56. US. Balling a Thousand, Nat. L.J., May 17, 1982, p. 9, col. 2. 
57. See general/r A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
58. Some, but by no means all, of the support for this position may have been due to 
the influence of the disclosures concerning Justices Fortas and Douglas on the witnesses. It 
was in response to such concerns that Justice Brandeis was thought to have disentangled 
himself from the outside world, even to the point of refusing to accept honorary degrees so 
as not to be beholden to any institution. Senate Hearings. supra note 2. at 142. But see B. 
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS-fRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVI-
TIES OF Two SUPREME CoURT JUSTICES (1980). 
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them.' "s9 
The witnesses were aware of the contrary history, beginning 
with John Jay, who served as secretary of state, ambassador to 
Great Britain, and candidate for governor of New York, all while 
he was sitting as our first Chief Justice.60 A number of other Jus-
tices also served on non-judicial bodies, such as the postal investi-
gation commission (Chief Justice Hughes) and the group, headed 
by Justice Lamar, that attempted to mediate the boundary dispute 
between Venezuela and British Guiana.61 In the period around 
World War II Justice Reed became chairman of the Committee to 
Improve the Civil Service, Justice Roberts investigated Pearl Har-
bor, and Justice Jackson took a year's leave to serve as the Ameri-
can prosecutor at Nuremburg. The most famous recent example 
of extra-judicial service was when Chief Justice Warren chaired 
the committee investigating the assassination of President 
Kennedy.62 
Several witnesses at the Ervin committee hearings questioned 
the propriety of such activities, although some admitted that there 
might be a few reasonable exceptions. Professor Alexander Bickel 
put it this way: 
The Court necessarily begets quite a sufficient amount of controversy in the dis-
charge of its office, and scarcely needs the additional controversy that a Justice 
draws to himself, and hence to it, by gratuitously identifying himself with one or 
another side of extraneous issues. There is, in other words, a drain not only on 
the Justice's energies, but on his prestige, on his reservoir of public trust and 
goodwill. He owes both his energies and his prestige to the Court, and should not 
dissipate these assets elsewhere. 63 
Judge Ralph Winter, then a law professor, expressed another ob-
jection to service on presidential commissions: 
[W]hen a Justice takes such a position, he is in a sense committing a kind of fraud 
on the American people, in that the purpose of his appointment is to trade on the 
prestige of the Court and to endow the conclusions that the commission comes to 
with that prestige and make it seem as though there has been a real judicial pro-
cess involved .... 64 
Whatever short-term benefit may have accrued as a result of 
Chief Justice Warren's service in the investigation of the Kennedy 
assassination seems to be outweighed by the doubts that have 
59. Senare Hearings, supra note 2, at 32. 
60. fd at 31-32. 
61. fd at31. 
62. fd 
63. Jd at31. 
64. Jd at 140. 
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arisen about that investigation. In his memoirs Warren recalled 
his initial reservations about serving: it would be inconsistent 
with the principle of separation of powers; it would take time 
away from his work on the Court; it might cause him to disqualify 
himself from litigation arising out of the investigation. Yet he 
took the job, and his memoirs reflect no sense that this was an 
unwise decision.65 Justice Roberts, in contrast, confessed that he 
had made a mistake in accepting outside appointments while on 
the Court.66 In retrospect it seems that none of these assignments 
of sitting Justices to presidential commissions turned out well, 
either for the work of their commissions or for the Court. 
Today no active Justice sits on an investigative commission. 
However, the Chief Justice has become involved in several other 
endeavors that raise similar questions. For example, in Congress 
the Judicial Conference and hence the Chief Justice speak for the 
federal judiciary. There are three dangers whenever a judge takes 
a legislative position on a controversial question: it may detract 
from his or her real or apparent impartiality in a subsequent case; 
the judge may be unable to limit himself to technical advice and 
thus become a special interest pleader like every other lobbyist; 
and, finally, it is hard to say what kinds of legislation are proper 
subjects of comment by the Justices. 
Two examples will illustrate the impartiality problem. Chief 
Justice Burger, trying to reduce the judicial work load, has ac-
tively supported several different measures by which the types of 
cases heard in the federal courts would be reduced. He has also 
expressed doubt about the ability of juries to handle complex civil 
cases. Those issues may well come before the Court in lawsuits 
seeking to determine what is permitted under current law. In such 
cases, the party whose position is not in conformity with the Chief 
Justice's legislative aims may well feel that he is not receiving a 
fair and impartial interpretation of the law as it now stands. 
Professor Bickel warned that even speeches and articles by 
judges endanger their basic role. His comments are even more apt 
in the context of judicial lobbying: 
If he goes on public record concerning issues that are likely to come before him in 
his judicial capacity, he thereby at least appears to close his mind, to make him-
self less reachable by reasoned briefs and arguments. And in some measure every 
man who goes on record in this fashion does in fact close his mind. Nothing is 
more persuasive to ourselves than our own published prose.67 
65. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 356-59 (1977). 
66. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 205. 
67. 1d at 142. 
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Judges, like the rest of us, hold views on a wide range of topics, 
many of which are not likely to be changed, no matter how elo-
quent the argument. But whatever chance exists surely becomes 
considerably smaller when those views are set in print. And ulti-
mately the question of whether judges should write and speak 
about controversial subjects does not tum on whether they will 
acquire closed minds, but rather on whether some litigants might 
reasonably believe so. 
This problem goes back at least as far as Chief Justice Taft, 
who engaged in many efforts to improve the judicial system 
through legislation.6s More recently, in 1967-68 Congress was 
considering legislation to control wiretapping by government offi-
cials. The Judicial Conference, then led by Earl Warren, trans-
mitted its views on the proposals at the same time that the Court 
was deliberating on some of the same issues. As one scholar ob-
served: "Judges in their administrative capacity were speaking au-
thoritatively on subjects which might later come before them in 
their judicial capacity. Although it is the judicial decision which 
is final, the latter may in fact determine the former, whether the 
subject matter relates to rules of procedure or substantial constitu-
tional questions. "69 
Successful legislative campaigns rarely are limited to gather-
ing information on the status of pending bills, submitting com-
ments for the record, and offering to answer questions. To be 
effective, one usually must engage in less passive forms of persua-
sion. This means more than testifying at congressional hearings. 
That is undoubtedly one reason why the Chief Justice discusses 
his legislative agenda in speeches before bar associations and 
other groups; he hopes, no doubt, that the remarks will be picked 
up by the media. 
Chief Justice Burger has twice been the center of the kind of 
controversy that is likely to recur when judges engage in lobbying. 
In one incident, he was reported to have sent Roland Kirks, then 
director of the Administrative Office, in the company of an influ-
ential Washington lawyer-lobbyist, to visit House Speaker Albert 
to campaign against some aspects of pending consumer legisla-
tionJo Kirks subsequently denied that the Chief Justice even 
knew about the lobbying trip until after it occurred, yet the Chief 
felt constrained to issue his own statement, which did not actually 
68. See, e.g., R. WHEELER & H. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 30 (1977) 
for Chief Justice Taft's role in creating the Judicial Conference. 
69. P. FtsH, supra note 7, at 243. 
70. Wash. Post, Oct. 3. 1978, p. Cll, col. 6. 
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deny that he had sent Kirks, although he subsequently took that 
position.?! It matters little who actually authorized whom to do 
what. What is significant is that the Chief Justice was so person-
ally involved in the lobbying process that he had to defend his 
actions in the public press. 
He also became very much involved with the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, making extensive eleventh hour efforts to delay 
the bill, including telephone calls to its sponsors and to highly 
placed persons on the Senate Judiciary Committee.n One of the 
bill's Senate supporters received a call from the Chief Justice in 
which Burger reportedly "not only lobbied, but pressured and at-
tempted to be intimidating," calling the Senator "irresponsible" 
for approving the bill and threatening to get the President to veto 
it.73 Appeals Court Judge Ruggero Aldisert, Chairman of the 
Bankruptcy Committee of the Judicial Conference, defended the 
Chief Justice, arguing that he was merely fulfilling his statutory 
duty to report the adverse recommendations of the Judicial Con-
ference.74 Even assuming that the Chief Justice was carrying out 
the will of the Judicial Conference, its position could readily have 
been communicated with far less direct personal involvement of 
the Chief Justice and consequent loss of prestige to the Court.75 
Such activities have led a popular network television news 
program to air a report about the Chief Justice, investigating his 
off-the-bench activities.76 In October 1980 Congressional Quar-
terly ran an article debating the wisdom of lobbying by federal 
judges and especially Chief Justice Burger.77 And the New York 
Times admonished that the duties of Chief Justice and lobbyist 
"sit uneasily in the same chair . . . ; the need for prudence should 
be evident."7s Thus, it appears that it is news when a Supreme 
Court Justice engages in lobbying, and resultant media coverage is 
potentially damaging to the perceived neutrality of the Court. 
Which legislative topics are out of bounds for judges? Chief 
Justice Burger has stated that he would not comment on any sub-
ject other than those relating to his "responsibilities for the admin-
71. Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1972, p. AI, col. 7; AIO, col. I. 
72. Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1978. p. Cll, col. 5. 
73. Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1978, p. Cl, col. 3. 
74. Aldisert, The Judicial Conference and the New Bankruptcr Act, 65 A.B.A. J. 229. 
299 ( 1979). 
75. See Kirp, The Justices Might Find a Gag's In Order, Wall St. J .. March 23, 1983. 
p. 30, col. 3. 
76. CBS Television's "60 Minutes," March 25, 1979. 
77. When Federal Judges Lobby, Congressmen Usual(r Listen, 38 Co>;GRESS!ONAL 
QUARTERLY 3167 (1980). 
78. N.Y. Times, Dec. I, 1978, p. A26, col. 2. 
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istration of justice."79 Professor Bickel said that he would like the 
Court to comment only on jurisdictional statutes, because they are 
"highly technical" and, without judicial advice about them, legis-
latures would operate nearly blindly.so 
Limiting comments to legislation affecting the administration 
of justice has a neutral and self-defining ring, but its parameters 
are quite amorphous. The Chief Justice has regularly expressed 
his dislike of proposals which would have created additional work 
for the federal courts. Yet in a recent interview, when asked about 
a bill to prevent federal courts from proceeding in controversial 
areas such as busing and school prayer, he declined to offer an 
opinion, replying "[t]hat is a subject I will have to leave to 
others."st The point is not that the Chief Justice was wrong to 
refuse to express his views in that instance, or that he should not 
have commented on other bills dealing with access to the federal 
courts. Rather, the two examples demonstrate that in some sense 
all these bills relate to "the administration of justice." Because the 
term is so potentially broad, it is an uncertain standard by which 
to decide which legislation is appropriate for judicial comment. 
Some topics are obviously too political, but the difficult question 
is, where should the line be drawn and who should draw it? One 
answer, of course, is to stay out of the legislative arena entirely. 
At most, the judiciary should answer legislative requests for its 
views, keeping replies as technical and objective as possible. 
Whenever the Chief Justice ventures beyond his judicial role, 
the possibility of creating an appearance of impropriety exists. 
One such opportunity is provided in the numerous appointments 
that he makes to committees of the Judicial Conference. Students 
of the Conference have recognized that these committee assign-
ments, though often arduous and always unremunerated, are cov-
eted by judges because they are one of the few means of status 
differentiation within the judiciary.s2 The assignment power en-
ables a Chief Justice to reward friends and allies. Consider this 
letter from Chief Justice Taft to a retired district judge, discussing 
legislation that would give the Chief more power regarding the 
assignment of judges to other locations: "[l]t may be that you and 
79. Why Courts Are In Trouble. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 31. 1975, pp. 
29-30. 
80. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 150. See also id at 138-39 (noting that the Judi-
ciary Acts of 1915 and 1916, amending the Court's appellate jurisdiction, were drafted by 
Justices VanDevanter and McReynolds). 
81. Unclogging the Courts-Chief Justice Speaks Our, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT. 
February 22, 1982, pp. 36. 38. 
82. P. FISH, supra note 7, at 273. 
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I can agree occasionally on your hearing cases in one of the 
Southern Districts in the winter time when the beauties of living 
in Maine are a matter of retrospect or prospect. "s3 Such a tiny 
reward is unlikely to destroy the judiciary's moral fiber, but one 
wonders whether the Chief Justice should be a part of this sort of 
petty patronage system. 
Consider also the role of Chief Justice Burger in the forma-
tion of the Supreme Court Historical Society, whose purpose is to 
promote the presentation of the history of the Court. Unlike the 
National Geographic Society, on whose board he also serves, the 
Chief Justice has not had to disqualify himself from any cases in-
volving the Historical Society. Still, his participation has raised 
questions about his role in the Society's fund raising, which in-
volves soliciting money from lawyers who appear before the 
Court and from litigants whose cases may be there.s4 Some ob-
servers believe that he unnecessarily damages the prestige of the 
Court by serving on the Society's board with, for example, Robert 
Stevens, the retired head of a textile firm that is frequently in-
volved in extremely bitter litigation, some of which reaches the 
Court. The situation is further clouded by Stevens's additional 
gift of $8,500, beyond his $5,000 lifetime membership in the Soci-
ety, which was used to commission a portrait of the Chief Justice 
for the National Portrait Gallery.ss Although these kinds of activ-
ities may produce only a faint whiff of impropriety, even that min-
imal damage is an excessive price to pay for the Chiefs 
participation. 
Even the Chief Justice's role as chancellor of the Smithsonian 
Institution causes problems that may reflect on the Court and may 
cause him to have to recuse himself in a tax case involving the 
valuation of gems given to that Institution. A recent newspaper 
story reported that the Internal Revenue Service has cracked 
down on what the Service alleges are "sham" valuations of gifts to 
the Smithsonian for which the donors deducted five times the 
amount they paid for them. The Chief Justice is involved because 
he and the Smithsonian's Secretary hosted a black tie dinner hon-
oring two of the four donors, a fact that appeared in the third 
paragraph of the article. Although there is not even a hint of 
wrongdoing on the part of Chief Justice Burger, the incident can-
not have helped his image or the Court's and, if the tax case goes 
83. /d at 34. 
84. Wash. Star, Nov. I, 1977, p. AI, rot. 4. 
85. !d at col. 2. 
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to the Supreme Court, it will at least cause some concern over 
whether the Chief Justice can hear it. 
Even as seemingly innocuous a task as "building manage." 
has produced unwanted litigation and publicity. Two individuals 
carrying signs (one of which merely recited the first amendment) 
on a sidewalk outside the Court were threatened with arrest be-
cause a federal statute made such conduct on the Court's grounds 
illegal.s6 They brought suit under the first amendment against the 
Supreme Court marshal, who is responsible for supervising the 
building under the direction of the entire Court, and Chief Justice 
Burger, who has the statutory duty of approving regulations gov-
erning the security and decorum of the Court's property.s7 Even-
tually, the case went to the Court, but despite his status as a 
named defendant the Chief Justice did not recuse himself. The 
fact that eventually the Court unanimously upheld the challengess 
did not prevent a columnist from highlighting the arguable con-
flict of interest in banner headlines in Sunday papers around the 
country: "Suing Burger in the Burger Court."s9 While some 
might lift an eyebrow whenever the Justices are called upon to 
decide a case involving protests on the Court's grounds, the prob-
lem would surely have been diminished if Congress had not made 
the Chief Justice responsible for the regulations, but instead had 
assigned the job to the General Services Administration, which 
manages most federal property, so that it rather than he had been 
named as a defendant. 
A recent series of events offers further evidence that the 
problems created by the multiple roles of the Chief Justice are not 
merely theoretical. On June 28, 1982, the Supreme Court de-
clared that the provisions of the bankruptcy law which allowed 
bankruptcy judges, who were not appointed for life, to decide cer-
tain kinds of cases, were unconstitutional. The Chief Justice cast 
one of three dissenting votes.90 Recognizing that the entire bank-
ruptcy system could be seriously disrupted, the Justices agreed to 
suspend the effect of their ruling until October 4, 1982, to enable 
Congress to remedy the matter. 
At that point, exit the Chief Justice as adjudicator, and enter 
the Chief Justice as lobbyist and administrator. One solution to 
this problem would be to make all bankruptcy judges lifetime fed-
eral judges. The Judicial Conference apparently saw the addition 
86. 40 U.S.C. § 13k (1976). 
87. 40 u.s.c. § 131 (1976). 
88. United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983). 
89. Anderson, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1982, p. B7, col. I. 
90. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). 
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of 227 bankruptcy judges as a diminution of the prestige of the 
current district judges and spoke out against it.91 At one point the 
Chief Justice even considered appearing on television to express 
his opposition to the proposal.92 
Meanwhile, as the October 4 deadline approached, it became 
apparent that Congress was unlikely to act. In early September 
the Conference, charged by Congress with overall responsibility 
for the smooth operation of the federal courts, decided to do 
something if Congress did not act.93 With no opportunity for 
public comment, it issued rules, which it recommended to all fed-
eral courts, on how to handle the problem if Congress continued 
to procrastinate. 
Whether because of doubts about the rules' legality or for 
some other reason, the Justice Department asked the Court to give 
Congress more time-until December 24, 1982, when the lame-
duck session was expected to be over. The Court agreed, and the 
problem was avoided for another two and a half months. But 
once again Congress could not agree on a solution, once again the 
Conference's interim solution was sent out, and once again the 
Department of Justice asked for more time. This time the Court, 
with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, said no. That left the 
federal courts with only the interim rules suggested by the Confer-
ence, with the Chief Justice's blessing. 
It is unclear whether the interim rules are valid. Even if Con-
gress eventually acts, the saga is not likely to end since some of 
those who lost cases under the interim rules will seek reversals on 
the ground that the Conference had no authority to issue them. 
If such a case goes to the Court, the Chief Justice will be hard 
put to maintain a semblance of judicial detachment. Indeed, he is 
not likely to be the only one with a predilection on the issue. He 
may well have talked to his colleagues when the second request 
for more time was denied in December and told them that doom 
would not truly result from the denial of the stay because the Ju-
dicial Conference rules would prevent chaos. Hence anyone chal-
lenging the rules could hardly be accused of being cynical if he 
felt that the judicial deck was stacked against him.94 
91. 1982 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 68-69 
(1982). 
92. N.Y. Times, December 12, 1982, p. 45, col. I. 
93. This chronology is set forth in H.R. REP. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1983), 
which accompanies H.R. 3, The Bankruptcy Coun Act of 1983. H.R. 3 would resolve the 
problem by giving anicle III status to all bankruptcy judges. . 
94. See Lempen. Judges Run Into Ethical Problems in Lobbying Fight, Legal Tunes of 
Wash., April 4. 1983, p. II, col. I. 
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The point is not that anyone did anything wrong or assumed 
roles not specifically authorized by Congress in trying to cope with 
this genuine problem. The difficulty arose because Congress had 
assigned nonjudicial functions to the Chief Justice which are 
plainly inconsistent with his judicial role. 
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
No single additional duty of the Chief Justice takes enough 
time away from deciding cases so that it can be described as inter-
fering with his judicial responsibilities. Nor will any single foray 
into the rule-making or legislative arena destroy the impartial im-
age of the Court. But cumulatively the accretion of duties in the 
office of the Chief Justice is an alarming phenomenon. 
The first remedy should be a moratorium on new duties for 
the Court or the Chief Justice. A recent proposal illustrates just 
how urgently we need this moratorium. However painful it may 
be for members of Congress to set their own salaries and decide 
how much of their expenses of living in Washington should be 
deductible on their federal tax returns, it surely turns the notion of 
separation of powers upside down to propose, as did the Senate 
majority and assistant majority leaders, that the job be turned 
over to the Supreme Court.95 Unless Congress stops looking to 
the Court to solve every difficult problem, the rest of the effort to 
reduce the power of the Chief Justice will almost certainly fail. 
We also should recognize that all of the Chief Justice's added 
duties do not cause equally severe problems of time commitment, 
political influence, and apparent prejudice. Unfortunately, the 
easier solutions don't often match the more serious problems. For 
instance, a retired Justice could replace the Chief on the boards of 
various institutes and societies, but this would have scarcely any 
effect on the Chiefs work week or on his influence over important 
policy matters. The Chief Justice also could abandon his role as 
ultimate supervisor of the Court's print shop, physical plant and 
support staff, with no great loss to the Court, but also no great 
gain. 
Finding a replacement for the Chief Justice as the head of the 
federal judiciary is much harder, partly because the position has 
so many components. One idea, proceeding from the opposite di-
rection, is to reduce the Court's work load, perhaps by establish-
ing a new court to handle some of the cases that now go to the 
95. S.J. Res. 164, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2022-23 (1982) (daily ed.). 
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Supreme Court.96 Even if there were sufficient support for such a 
change, it would address only one aspect of the problem of nonju-
dicial activities. 
Developing an earlier suggestion of Chief Justice Burger, 
Professor Daniel Meado£97 urged that the administrative func-
tions of overseeing the work of the committees of the Judicial 
Conference, supervising the Administrative Office, and heading 
the Federal Judicial Center be assigned to a newly created post 
called "Chancellor of the United States Courts."9s Creating that 
job, which might well be filled by a sitting federal judge who 
would assume the duties on a full-time, but temporary basis, 
would relieve the Chief Justice of most of his administrative du-
ties pertaining to the federal judicial system. As Meador recog-
nizes, the basic idea has several possible variants, each with its 
own advantages and disadvantages, but with none likely to re-
place all of the Chief Justice's obligations. Yet the concept de-
serves further study. 
If one of our concerns is the amount of power possessed by 
Chief Justices, then one way to attack the problem would be to 
limit the time that any person may serve as Chief Justice. The 
Constitution gives all federal judges life tenure; it does not require 
that the Justice who is also designated as Chief must remain in 
that position as long as he or she remains on the Court. Since 
1958, the chief judges of the district and circuit courts have been 
required to step down at the age of seventy, although they may 
remain active judges.99 In 1982 Congress further reduced the pe-
riod that any person may serve as chief judge to seven years or the 
age of seventy, whichever comes first.wo The same approach 
makes even more sense for the Chief Justice of the United States. 
Not only does he have more nonjudicial duties than do most 
lower court judges, but his influence is far greater than the leader 
of any circuit or district court. A fixed term, whether determined 
by age or years of service in the job, would militate against the 
96. While not yet ready to take a position on the means by which the Supreme 
Coun's work load should be reduced permanently, Chief Justice Burger endorsed as an 
interim measure, to last for five years, a temporary panel consisting of couns of appeals 
judges, which would resolve intercircuit conflicts. 1983 ABA Speech, supra note 23. at II. 
Legislation to achieve that end is now pending in the Senate. S. 645, 98 Cong .. 1st Sess. 
§ 604 (1983). 
97. Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REv. 1031 
(1979). 
98. Jd at 1049-53. 
99. Pub. L. No. 85-593, §§ I, 2, 72 Stat. 497 ((codified at 28 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)). 
100. Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 201, 202, 96 Stat. 52 ((codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(3). 
136(a)(3} (West Supp. 1983)}. 
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possibility that any Chief Justice would wield too much power or 
become out of touch with the political mood of the country. And 
to the extent that nonjudicial obligations drain the Chiefs energy, 
relieving him of his special duties as Chief will help in the later 
years when even the most vigorous tend to slow down. 
In the meantime, we need to acknowledge that the job of be-
ing Chief Justice is not simply that of the highest judge in the 
land. It seems unlikely that any Chief Justice could greatly reduce 
his nonjudicial activities merely by eliminating the relatively few 
tasks that Congress has not imposed. It should be apparent that 
the position calls not only for a superior lawyer, but also an able 
administrator, an extraordinarily energetic individual with a 
broad view of our system of justice and a commitment to exercise 
the powers of the office in an even-handed manner. 
The full scope of the Chief Justice's duties is of more than 
academic concern, since Chief Justice Burger has recently cele-
brated his seventy-fifth birthday. When the search for his succes-
sor is undertaken, it should be done with a greater appreciation 
than in the past of the power and scope of the Chief Justice's du-
ties. For if the search is not premised on an accurate assessment 
of the position, we will never find a person who can perform its 
functions adequately. If our Chief Justices are going to do much 
more than decide cases, we need to be sure that they are qualified 
for their whole job. 
